Los Angeles Personal Injury Lawyer - California

LAT: Headed to the Emergency Room? Bring a book...

Paul Kiesel — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 19:13:07 GMT

The stereotype of hospital emergency rooms crowded with patients waiting endlessly to be seen by a doctor is true, according to a new study in Tuesday's edition of Archives of Internal Medicine. The conventional wisdom that throngs of low-income, uninsured people who use the ER as a substitute for primary care visits are to blame, however, is wrong.

First, a few statistics:

In 1997, the median wait time for ER patients was 22 minutes. By 2006, it was 33 minutes.
Per capita use of ERs was 40.5 visits per 100 people in 2006, up from 34.2 visits per 100 people a decade earlier.
The proportion of ER patients deemed to be suffering from a real medical emergency fell from 26.9% in 1997 to 18.3% in 2007.
The percentage of ER patients who lacked health insurance remained between 16% and 17% between 1997 and 2006.

These and other statistics were gleaned from data on 151,999 patient visits to emergency departments recorded in the National Hospital Ambulatory and Medical Care Survey. The survey includes four triage categories – emergent (patient should be seen within 14 minutes), urgent (15-60 minutes), semiurgent (61 minutes to two hours) and nonurgent (anywhere from two to 24 hours).

Though wait times got longer for everyone, the problem was worst for emergent patients – their median wait times increased by 4.6% per year, the study found. Waits for urgent patients grew 2.8% per year for urgent patients, 3.9% per year for semiurgent patients, and 1.6% for nonurgent patients.

Put another way, only 56.6% of emergent patients saw a doctor within the time recommended by triage staff, compared to 100% of nonurgent patients. Overall, the proportion of patients who got to a doctor within the “triage target time” fell from 80% in 2000 to 75.9% in 2006, the study found.

One theory to account for increased ER wait times is that more people who can’t afford to go to a regular doctor wind up coming to the ER instead, where federal law guarantees they’ll be treated regardless of ability to pay. The survey data corroborated this to an extent, finding that 17% of uninsured patients in the ER were classified as nonurgent, compared to only 13.9% of people who had private insurance. That works out to about 567,000 extra visits each year.

Click here for the rest of the article.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Metrolink Settles Most Cases from 2005 Glendale Train Crash

Paul Kiesel — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 16:33:29 GMT

From the Los Angeles Times:

After years of legal wrangling, Metrolink has settled most of the outstanding lawsuits arising from the 2005 Glendale crash that killed 11 people and injured about 180, the second-deadliest in Metrolink’s history, attorneys said.

Metrolink has agreed to pay $30 million to settle the majority of the approximately 150 claims and lawsuits filed against Metrolink, according to the lead plaintiff's attorney.

The remaining cases are expected to be resolved in the next month, plaintiffs’ attorneys said.

Any cases that are not settled are scheduled to go to trial in January.

Metrolink could not immediately be reached for comment.

A claims report in a July agenda for Metrolink’s board said it would be paying $3,901,500 in seven recently resolved lawsuits. Most of the cases involving serious injuries and fatalities were settled in a flurry of mediation talks in the last six months, attorneys said.

Plaintiffs' attorneys said Metrolink showed little interest in settling the larger cases until this April, more than four years after the Jan. 26, 2005, incident, which was the most severe in its history until last year’s Chatsworth crash.

“There was a sea change in attitude,” said Jerry Ringler, the lead plaintiff’s attorney, said in a recent interview. “I think we developed liability theories that were extremely powerful.”

In the 2005 crash, a Compton laborer parked his Jeep Grand Cherokee on the tracks and doused the interior with gasoline in what he later claimed was a suicide attempt.

A three-car southbound train, which was being pushed by a locomotive, slammed into the car, skidded down the tracks, then derailed. The lead passenger car crashed into an idle freight train, jackknifed and collided into a passenger train going the opposite direction on its way to Burbank.

“Thus far, we believe the Glendale settlements have been fair and reasonable given that Juan Alvarez, who parked his jeep on the Metrolink right-of-way, has been subsequently convicted of 11 counts of first-degree murder,” Ringler said in a statement released today.

Click here for the rest of the article.

And click here to read archived blogs related to Metrolink.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Metrolink Still Struggling with Saftey Improvements

Paul Kiesel — Tue, 08 Sep 2009 15:18:10 GMT

From the Los Angeles Times:

As the anniversary of the Sept. 12 Chatsworth train disaster approaches, officials with Southern California's sprawling commuter rail service are facing a vexing array of technical, financial and potential legal challenges as they struggle to deliver on pledges of trailblazing safety reforms.

A burst of energy to remake the region's Metrolink train operation was unleashed by the deadliest rail collision in modern California history, a watershed event that killed 25, injured 130 and prompted landmark federal mandates to modernize the nation's rail safety systems.

Today, the rush to reform Metrolink -- a thinly staffed hybrid transportation agency once derided as the political stepchild of the five counties that created it -- is becoming increasingly costly, time-consuming and complicated.

Labor leaders are digging in to fight an unprecedented push by agency officials to place locomotive train crews under continuous video surveillance.

Technical and financial challenges loom over an ambitious schedule to a deploy a $200-million collision-avoidance network for all commuter, freight and intercity trains moving across hundreds of miles of track.

Meanwhile, Metrolink officials have reversed course on an effort to assume direct control over hiring, training and supervising rail crews, a move prompted partly by disclosures that in Chatsworth, an engineer employed by a contractor apparently ran a red light while sending a text message on his cellphone just before colliding head-on with a freight train.

Fearing that trying to manage on-board train crews could overtax staff and trigger thorny labor issues, Metrolink's board of directors opted to farm out the critical function again, this time to Amtrak.

Compounding financial strains, ridership has been sliding since the crash, largely because of lower gas prices and the recession. Fare revenues dropped $1.4 million below estimates in the last quarter alone.

And operating insurance premiums recently surged $1 million above estimates because of Metrolink's accident history over the last decade, averaging one potentially catastrophic liability payout every two years, records show.

Although no major wrecks have occurred since Chatsworth, smaller accidents involving cars and pedestrians are running about the same this year as last -- 3.25 and 3.4 per month, respectively, the agency says.

But a rash of incidents leading up to this week's memorial observances has served as a reminder of the risks Metrolink confronts in its heavily urban mixed-rail environment.

Click here for the rest of the article.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Japanese Gangsters, Illegitimate Liver Transplants, Unauthorized Bank Accounts and UCLA

Paul Kiesel — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 20:02:46 GMT

First, the unauthorized bank account referred to in the title of this blog stems from the UCLA Willed Body fiasco that took place from 1999-2003. Henry Reid, the former Willed Body Program director at UCLA, who sold cadavers and cadaver parts to Ernest Nelson (body parts broker), used an unauthorized bank account that aesthetically (checks, invoices, etc.) appeared to be an authorized UCLA bank account (it was surreptitiously established by three UCLA employees), to embezzle tens of thousands of dollars over a four-to-six-year period.

Not surprisingly, during the same period that UCLA carelessly allowed its Willed Body Program to be run into the ground by Henry Reid, who, oddly, didn't testify in the trial against Ernest Nelson (even though it was pretty obvious by the copious exhibits presented to the jury that the trial against Ernest Nelson was in fact the trial against both of the hapless body brokers), UCLA allowed Japanese gangsters, who should have never been permitted into the U.S. (thanks, FBI), to receive liver transplants ahead of over 100 patients in terrible need of the same procedure.

From the Los Angeles Times:

UCLA Medical Center and its most accomplished liver surgeon provided a life-saving transplant to one of Japan's most powerful gang bosses, law enforcement sources told The Times.

In addition, the surgeon performed liver transplants at UCLA on three other men who are now barred from entering the United States because of their criminal records or suspected affiliation with Japanese organized crime groups, said a knowledgeable law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The four surgeries were done between 2000 and 2004 at a time of pronounced organ scarcity. In each of those years, more than 100 patients died awaiting liver transplants in the greater Los Angeles region.

The surgeon in each case was Dr. Ronald W. Busuttil, executive chairman of UCLA's surgery department, according to another person familiar with the matter who also spoke on condition of anonymity. Busuttil is a world-renowned liver surgeon who co-edited a leading text on liver transplantation and is one of the highest-paid employees in the University of California system.

Click here for the rest of the article.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

California Closer to Banning BPA in Plastics

Paul Kiesel — Tue, 02 Jun 2009 18:40:32 GMT

From the Los Angeles Times:

Reporting from Sacramento -- Despite a fierce lobbying effort by the U.S. chemical industry, the state Senate narrowly approved a proposal Tuesday that would ban the use of a substance in baby bottles, toddler sippy cups and food containers that independent scientists say is a threat to childhood development.

The bill by state Sen. Fran Pavley (D-Agoura Hills) prohibiting the use of bisphenol A -- more commonly dubbed BPA -- now goes to the Assembly, where it is expected to face a wall of resistance from manufacturers of the infant products that contain the controversial chemical.

Industry leaders have targeted California for an orchestrated lobbying and grassroots PR campaign to turn back efforts by health and consumer groups to ban the use of the chemical, a component in the manufacture of plastic containers.

Researchers from the chemical industry say the public health threat has been vastly overblown. But more than 200 independent scientific studies have linked BPA to brain development and behavioral problems in young children, early puberty and the eventual onset of some types of cancer. Scientists say the chemical can leach into a liquid, particularly when a bottle or cup is heated.

Pavley said on the floor that the goal of her legislation is to protect "the most vulnerable," stressing that affordable alternatives are already available to the chemical industry.

"For each year we delay, 500,000 babies are born in California" who could be affected, she declared.

The measure squeaked through with a bar majority largely on partisan lines, 21-16, though two Democrats -- Sens. Ron Calderon (D-Montebello) and Gloria Negrete McLeod (D-Chino) voted with the Republicans.

Sen. George Runner (R-Lancaster) said the measure is a "knee jerk reaction" that sidesteps efforts the state undertook just last year to more fully study the effects of potential chemical threats before adopting blanket bans.

BPA has been used since the 1950s as an additive to give plastics more strength and is common in hundreds of household products, including plastic bottles and food containers. It is also used in the linings of canned goods such as soup, baby formula and fruits or vegetables.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Ignorance meets Incompetence: The Criminal Trial of Ernest Nelson, UCLA Body Broker

Paul Kiesel — Fri, 29 May 2009 20:03:12 GMT

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Click here for other blog posts by this author.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Lax Oversight Forces Metrolink to Hire Own Crews

Paul Kiesel — Thu, 28 May 2009 19:41:52 GMT

From the Los Angeles Times:

In the latest fallout from last year's Metrolink disaster, the Southern California commuter rail agency could begin directly hiring and managing its engineers and conductors next year, taking full responsibility for key tasks historically delegated to outside contractors.

The move, which officials say appears likely, comes after Metrolink's relationship with the current provider of train crews, Connex Railroad, was soured by allegations of lax oversight. The company recently gave formal notice that it does not plan to extend its operating agreement.

The Metrolink board first raised the prospect of ending the agreement after the Chatsworth collision with a freight train, which killed 25 and injured 135.

Assuming direct control of train crews would mark a major change for Metrolink, a 17-year-old, five-county public agency that grew rapidly by relying largely on private firms for everything from maintaining rail cars to fixing signals.

But the mood shifted after the Chatsworth catastrophe, in which a Connex engineer who had been text-messaging on his cellphone drove Metrolink 111 head-on into a Union Pacific freight train. The Sept. 12 accident, which federal investigators say came after the Connex engineer ran a red light, has set off what could be one of costliest railroad liability court battles on record.

It also prompted disclosures that, in violation of safety regulations, the engineer sent and received hundreds of text messages while on duty in the days before the collision. Robert M. Sanchez, who died in the crash, also sneaked young rail enthusiasts into the control cabs of passenger trains for ride-alongs, investigators found. Metrolink ordered the removal of two company managers after the disclosures.

Connex has defended its safety and supervision record, saying it has an intensive field testing program that exceeds industry standards. In a recent letter...

Click here for the rest of the article.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Ernest Nelson Found Guilty in UCLA Body-Parts Program Scandal

Paul Kiesel — Thu, 14 May 2009 15:53:39 GMT

SEE BOLD CAPS FOR EDITORIAL COMMENTS

From the Los Angeles Times:

A businessman accused of selling body parts from corpses donated to UCLA medical school in a scandal that tarnished the reputation of the university's willed body program THE PROGRAM, DURING 1999-2003, WHEN ERNEST NELSON AND HENRY REID, THE PROGRAM'S FORMER DIRECTOR, WERE PURCHASING AND SELLING PARTS FROM ONE ANOTHER, WAS NOT CONSIDERED AS VENERABLE AS UCLA HAS TRIED TO PORTRAY IT; IN FACT, UCLA'S WILLED BODY PROGRAM WAS STILL RECOVERING FROM A 1993 INCIDENT (CADAVERS, FROM THE WILLED BODY PROGRAM WERE HANDLED "WITHOUT DIGNITY" AND DUMPED INTO THE PACIFIC OCEAN ALONG WITH OTHER MEDICAL WASTE FROM THE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE) was found guilty today in Los Angeles Superior Court of conspiring to commit grand theft, embezzlement and tax evasion .

Prosecutors alleged that Ernest V. Nelson, 51, cut up heads, torsos and other parts from donated bodies and sold them without UCLA's permission to medical and pharmaceutical research companies, collecting $1.5 million between 1999 and 2003. THE PEOPLE, THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL AGAINST MR. NELSON, TRIED ARGUING THAT UCLA HAD LOST $1.5 MILLION VIA NELSON AND REID'S CHICANERY. HOWEVER, IF NELSON HAD STOLEN $1.5 FROM UCLA, THEN LOGICALLY SPEAKING, UCLA WOULD HAVE NEEDED TO HAVE SOLD THE PARTS ON ITS OWN AND COLLECTED THAT MUCH MONEY, RIGHT? AND IF THAT'S THE CASE, THEN UCLA WOULD HAVE BEEN PARTICIPATING IN ILLEGAL BODY PARTS TRAFFICKING; MEANING THEY NEVER WOULD HAVE (NOR SHOULD HAVE) BEEN ABLE TO MAKE THAT MUCH MONEY BY USING, NOT SELLING, THE DONATED BODIES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH. THEREFORE, THE IDEA THAT NELSON STOLE OVER A MILLION DOLLARS FROM UCLA IS NOT ONLY A REACH, BUT IT'S AN OUTLANDISH ARGUMENT.

The bodies were donated to UCLA for medical and scientific research (AH, SEE, FOR RESEARCH, NOT FOR UCLA TO SELL AT $1.5 MILLION) at the university. The scandal over the sale of the body parts became public in 2004 and prompted UCLA to shut down the program for more than 18 months. UCLA ALSO HAD TO ATTEND TO OTHER PROBLEMS THAT WERE DISCOVERED THROUGHOUT THE PROGRAM, TOO: SANITARY ISSUES; "CADAVER ROOMS" THAT WERE OVERCROWDED; MAJOR ACCOUNTING, BOOKKEEPING AND INVENTORY ISSUES, ETC.

Prosecutors said Nelson hatched the scheme with the director of the willed body program, Henry Reid (WHO, BY THE WAY, WAS NEVER CALLED TO THE STAND TO TESTIFY AGAINST NELSON, EVEN THOUGH THE PEOPLE'S CASE WAS LARGELY BUILT AROUND REID'S ACTIONS, INTENT AND MALEVOLENCE AND THEN HOW NELSON WORKED WITH HIM TO SELL THE BODY PARTS (AND PREPARE THEM) TO PHARMACEUTICAL AND MEDICAL RESEARCH COMPANIES. WHY WASN'T REID CALLED TO THE STAND? BECAUSE, INCREDULOUSLY, THE PROSECUTION FORGOT TO FILE THE CORRECT PAPERWORK AND FOLLOW ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN ORDER TO TRANSFER REID TO LOS ANGELES FROM THE FEDERAL PRISON HE'S CURRENTLY RESIDING IN WITHIN A TIMELY MANNER.), who pleaded guilty last year to conspiring to commit theft. Reid received checks from Nelson totaling $43,000 in return for giving him access to the bodies, prosecutors said.

Nelson's attorney argued that the payments to Reid were legitimate. He accused the program director of pocketing the money instead of forwarding it to the university. (WHICH WAS AN INTERESTING ARGUMENT: UCLA HAD THREE OF ITS EMPLOYEES, INCLUDING DR. ROBERT B. TRELEASE, A PATHOLOGY PROFESSOR WHO FREQUENTLY USED BODIES FROM THE WILLED BODY PROGRAM TO INSTRUCT MEDICAL STUDENTS AND WHO, IN THE PAST, HAD A MORE ACTIVE ROLE WITHIN THE PROGRAM, SET UP A BANK ACCOUNT, COUNTER TO TYPICAL UCLA ACCOUNTING PRACTICES, AT A WESTWOOD BANK OF AMERICA BRANCH, WHICH WOULD BE THE SAME ACCOUNT USED BY HENRY REID TO FUNNEL THE MONEY MADE FROM SELLING PARTS TO NELSON, INTO HIS OWN PERSONAL BANK ACCOUNT. UCLA, BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THEN WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THAT BANK ACCOUNT, CONSIDERING THREE RESPECTED EMPLOYEES SET UP THE ACCOUNT BACK IN 1995, TWO YEARS BEFORE REID BECAME THE PROGRAM'S DIRECTOR... HMM...?)

CLICK HERE FOR THE ENTIRE LOS ANGELES TIMES ARTICLE WITHOUT MY COMMENTARY.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

LA Times: Blue Shield of California Insurance Holders Owed Thousands of Dollars

Paul Kiesel — Tue, 03 Mar 2009 17:46:34 GMT

In 1996, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) was established to ensure that people who lost their jobs were able to remain insured.

Under HIPPA, insurers must offer their most popular coverage options to people whose COBRA coverage has run out. COBRA (which stands for Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986) was created to extend job-based group insurance coverage for up to three years after leaving or losing a job, however, completely at the individual's expense.

Basically, in California, HIPPA is supposed to keep insurers from hiking up premiums to unaffordable rates (especially after losing COBRA coverage) for the state's sick and jobless. Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of California had other ideas.

Both companies have chosen not to adhere to the state-issued rates and have been charging insurance holders up to 55% more than they should have been charged.

Anthem has been made aware of what a spokeswoman said was "an error," but Blue Shield doesn't think it's done anything wrong and will continue to charge its policy holders because Blue Shield doesn't think the state-issued rate is legally binding. But they're wrong and they owe as many as 6,000 policy holders thousands of dollars from over-charged premium payments, since at least 2006.

Los Angeles Times article here.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel

Another Ethex and KV Pharma Drug Recall

Paul Kiesel — Mon, 02 Feb 2009 16:45:35 GMT

For the fifth time in just over 12 months, Ethex Corporation, a subsidiary of KV Pharmaceutical (drug manufacturer), issued another voluntary recall on several of their drug products, including various sized morphine sulfate tablets.

As noted previously in this blog, Ethex has had a serious problem with the consistency of its drug products' tablet size, as many of its prescription drugs, particularly morphine sulfate, have been manufactured twice the size than the product label suggests. This reoccurring problem can lead to drug dependency, myriad health problems, and even death.

Below is the drug recall information listed on Ethex Corp.'s website. Anyone in possession of these listed drugs and lot numbers should immediately consult a physician.

ETHEX Corporation Issues Nationwide Voluntary Recall of Products

St. Louis, Jan. 28, 2009 – ETHEX Corporation, a subsidiary of KV Pharmaceutical (NYSE: KVa/KVb), is issuing, as previously disclosed by KV Pharmaceutical Company on January 26, 2009, a nationwide voluntary recall of the products identified below (all lots within their expiration dates) at a wholesale or a retail level as a precautionary measure because they may have been manufactured under conditions that did not sufficiently comply with current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMPs). Some of these products have had specific lots recalled earlier due to defects found, including oversized tablets delivering higher than labeled doses. These additional products are being removed to assure that no other defective products remain in the marketplace.

Patients who may have these medicines in their possession should continue to take them in accordance with their prescriptions, as the risk of suddenly stopping needed medication may place patients at risk. Patients should contact their physician or healthcare provider if they have experienced any problems that may be related to taking or using these products, or to obtain replacement medications or prescriptions.

Products Recalled to WHOLESALE Level:

Amlodipine Besylate Tablets, 10mg (58177-538-26 & 538-11)
Amlodipine Besylate Tablets, 2.5mg (58177-536-26)
Amlodipine Besylate Tablets, 5mg (58177-537-26, 537-07 & 537-11)
Benazepril HCl Tablets, 10mg (58177-342-04 & 342-08)
Benazepril HCl Tablets, 20mg (58177-343-04 & 343-08)
Benazepril HCl Tablets, 40mg, (58177-344-04 & 344-08)
Benazepril HCl Tablets, 5mg (58177-341-04)
Benzonatate Capsules, 100mg (58177-091-04 & 091-08)
Benzonatate Capsules, 200mg (58177-092-04 & 092-08)
Bromfenex ER Capsules (58177-019-04)
Bromfenex PD ER Capsules (58177-020-04)
Buspirone HCl Tablets, 10mg (58177-265-04 & 265-08)
Buspirone HCl Tablets, 15mg (58177-309-04 & 309-08)
Buspirone HCl Tablets, 5mg (58177-264-04 & 264-08)
Codeine Phosphate/Guaifenesin Tablets, 10mg (58177-223-04)
Dextroamphetamine Sulfate Tablets, 10mg (58177-312-04)
Dextroamphetamine Sulfate Tablets, 5mg (58177-311-04)
Dextroamphetamine Tablets, 10mg (58177-312-04)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 120mg (58177-061-11)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 120mg (58177-061-19 & 061-26)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 180mg (58177-062-09 & 062-11)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 180mg (58177-062-19 & 062-26)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 240mg (58177-063-09 & 063-11)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 240mg (58177-063-19 & 063-26)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 300mg (58177-064-19 & 064-26)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 360mg (58177-065-09 & 065-11)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 360mg (58177-065-19 & 065-26)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 420mg (58177-066-09 & 066-11)
Diltiazem HC1 Capsules, 420mg (58177-066-19 & 066-26)
Disopyramide Phosphate ER Capsules, 150mg (58177-002-04)
Doxazosin Mesylate Tablets, 1mg (58177-266-04 & 266-08)
Doxazosin Mesylate Tablets, 2mg (58177-267-04 & 267-08)
Doxazosin Mesylate Tablets, 4mg (58177-268-04 & 268-08)
Doxazosin Mesylate Tablets, 8mg (58177-269-04 & 269-08)
Ethedent Chewable Tablets, .25mg (58177-432-40)
Ethedent Chewable Tablets, .5mg (58177-433-40 & 433-09)
Ethedent Chewable Tablets, 1mg (58177-434-40 & 434-09)
EthexDerm BPW-10, 10% (58177-929-65)
EthexDerm BPW-5, 5% (58177-928-65)
Ethezyme 650 (58177-868-02)
Ethezyme 830 Papain-Urea (58177-816-02)
Ethezyme Papain-Urea (58177-804-02)
ETH-Oxydose Concentrated Solution (58177-914-04 & 914-56)
Guaifenex DM ER Tablets (58177-213-04)
Guaifenex GP ER Tablets (58177-373-04)
Guaifenex PSE 120 ER Tablets (58177-208-04)
Guaifenex PSE 60 ER Tablets (58177-214-04)
Guaifenex PSE 80 Tablets (58177-413-04)
Guaifenex PSE 85 Tablets (58177-478-04)
Hista-Vent DA Tablets (58177-227-04)
Hista-Vent PSE tablets (58177-426-04)
Histinex HC Liquid (58177-877-07 & 877-12)
Histinex PV Liquid (58177-883-07)
Hydrocodone Bitartrate & Acetaminophen Liquid (58177-909-07)
Hydrocodone Bitartrate/Guaifenesin Liquid (58177-881-07)
Hydrocortisone and Iodoquinol Cream, 1% (58177-803-02)
Hydroquinone 4% Cream w/SS, 1oz. (58177-802-02)
Hydroquinone 4% Cream, 1oz. (58177-801-02)
Hydro-Tussin CBX Liquid (58177-924-07)
Hydro-Tussin DHC Syrup (58177-926-07)
Hydro-Tussin DM Liquid (58177-906-07)
Hydro-Tussin EXP Liquid (58177-927-07)
HydroTussin HC Syrup (58177-915-07)
Hydro-Tussin Liquid (58177-890-07)
Hydro-Tussin XP Liquid (58177-916-07)
Hyoscyamine Orally Disintegrating Tablets, .125mg (58177-423-04)
Hyoscyamine Sublingual Tablets, .125mg (58177-255-04)
Hyoscyamine Sulfate ER Tablets, .375mg (58177-237-04)
Hyoscyamine Sulfate ER Capsules, .375mg (58177-017-04)
Hyoscyamine Sulfate Oral Tablets, .125mg (58177-274-04)
Isosorbide Mononitrate ER Tablets, 120mg (58177-201-04)
Isosorbide Mononitrate ER Tablets, 30mg (58177-222-04, 222-08 & 222-11)
Isosorbide Mononitrate ER Tablets, 60mg (58177-238-04, 238-08 & 238-11)
Meperidine/Promethazidne Capsules (58177-027-04)
Morphine InveAmp, 20mg x 1mL (58177-886-56)
Morphine InveAmp, 5mg/.25mL (58177-888-80)
Morphine Sulfate Concentrated Oral Solution 20mg/1ml (58177-886-01, 886-03 &886-05)
Morphine Sulfate Concentrated Oral Solution, 20mg/1ml (58177-886-57)
Morphine Sulfate ER Tablets, 100mg (58177-340-04)
Morphine Sulfate ER Tablets, 15mg (58177-310-04)
Morphine Sulfate ER Tablets, 200mg (58177-380-04)
Morphine Sulfate ER Tablets, 30mg (58177-320-04)
Morphine Sulfate ER Tablets, 60mg (58177-330-04)
Morphine Sulfate IR Tablets, 15mg (58177-313-04)
Morphine Sulfate IR Tablets, 30mg (58177-314-04)
NitroQuick Sublingual Tablets, .3mg (58177-323-04)
NitroQuick Sublingual Tablets, .4mg (58177-324-18 & 324-04)
NitroQuick Sublingual Tablets, .6mg (58177-325-04)
Nystatin Topical Powder, USP 15 grams (58177-839-45)
Nystatin Topical Powder, USP 30 grams (58177-839-46)
Nystatin Topical Powder, USP 60 grams (58177-839-61)
Ondansetron Orally Disintegrating Tablets, 4mg (58177-363-22)
Ondansetron Orally Disintegrating Tablets, 8mg (58177-364-22 & 364-56)
Oxycodone HCl Capsules, 5mg (58177-041-04 & 041-11)
Oxycodone HCl IR Tablets, 10mg (58177-461-04)
Oxycodone HCl IR Tablets, 15mg, (58177-445-04)
Oxycodone HCl IR Tablets, 20mg (58177-462-04)
Oxycodone HCl IR Tablets, 30mg (58177-446-04)
Oxycodone HCl IR Tablets, 5mg (58177-625-04 & 625-11)
Pangestyme CN 20 (58177-030-04)
Pangestyme CN10 (58177-029-04)
Pangestyme EC 100 (58177-031-04)
Pangestyme EC 250 (58177-031-06)
Pangestyme MT16 (58177-028-04)
Pangestyme UL12 (58177-048-04)
Pangestyme UL18 (58177-049-04)
Pangestyme UL20 (58177-050-04)
PhenaVent Capsules (58177-078-19)
PhenaVent D Tablets (58177-444-04)
PhenaVent LA Capsules (58177-095-19)
PhenaVent PED Capsules (58177-079-04)
Plaretase 800 (58177-416-04 & 416-08)
Potassium Chloride ER Capsules, 10mEq (58177-001-04, 001-08, 001-09, & 001-11)
Potassium Chloride ER Capsules, 8mEq (58177-677-04 & 677-08)
Potassium Chloride ER Tablets, 20mEq (58177-202-04, 202-08, 202-09 & 202-11)
Prednisolone Sodium Oral Solution (58177-932-05)
Prednisolone Syrup 15mg/5mL (58177-910-05 & 910-07)
Prednisolone Syrup 5mg/5mL (58177-912-03)
Propafenone HCl Tablets, 150mg (58177-331-04 & 331-11)
Propafenone HCl Tablets, 225mg (58177-332-04)
Propafenone HCl Tablets, 300mg (58177-333-04)
Pseudovent 400 Capsules (58177-096-04)
Pseudovent Capsules (58177-045-04)
Pseudovent PED Capsules (58177-046-04)
Tri-Vent DM Syrup (58177-925-07)
Tri-Vent DPC Liquid (58177-923-07)
Tri-Vent HC Liquid (58177-920-07)

Products Recalled to RETAIL PHARMACY Level:

Hydromorphone HCl Tablets, 2mg (58177-620-04 & 620-11)
Hydromorphone HCl Tablets, 4mg (58177-621-04 & 621-11)
Hydromorphone HCl Tablets, 8mg (58177-449-04)
Metoprolol Succinate ER Tablets, 50mg (58177-369-04, 369-09 & 369-11)
Metoprolol Succinate ER Tablets, 100mg (58177-368-04, 368-09 & 368-11)
Metoprolol Succinate ER Tablets, 25mg (58177-293-04, 293-09 & 293-11)
Metoprolol Succinate ER Tablets, 200mg (58177-358-04, 358-09 & 358-11)

Any wholesale or retail customer inquiries related to this action should be addressed to ETHEX Customer Service at 1-800-748-1472, faxed to ETHEX Customer Service at 314-646-3788, or e-mailed to customer-service@ethex.com. Representatives are available Monday through Friday, 8 am to 5 pm CST.

ETHEX Corporation has initiated recall notifications to wholesalers (and to retailers for Hydromorphone HCl and Metoprolol Succinate only) nationwide who received any inventory of the recalled products with instructions for returning the recalled products. Patients with questions about the recall should call the telephone number above, or contact their healthcare providers.

This recall is being conducted with the knowledge of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). At this time, the company is unable to determine when distribution of these products will resume.

Any adverse reactions experienced with the use of these products should also be reported to the FDA’s MedWatch Program by phone at 1-800-FDA-1088, by fax at 1-800-FDA-0178, by mail at MedWatch, FDA, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD 20852-9787, or on the MedWatch website at www.fda.gov/medwatch.

The recall announcement is posted on www.kvpharma.com.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Paul Kiesel